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Courts have an important place in American life. Whilemany would think first of the police as the institutionmost directly responsible for maintaining the law, the
courts are an integral part of ensuring social order. Indeed, as
illustrated by practices regarding warrants and cases challeng-
ing police action, much of the authority typically attributed to
the police is, to some degree, controlled by the courts. 
Importantly, however, as is often the case with institutions
of government in the United States, this considerable author-
ity comes with relatively limited power: The judiciary controls
“neither the purse nor the sword,” leaving it heavily reliant
upon other institutions and upon the public in general.1 Thus,
an extreme argument can be made that the courts need the pos-
itive perceptions of the majority of the public to function at
all,2 but others have pointed to these perceptions as important
simply because effective courts should be perceived well by the
public they serve.3 In either case, there is little question that
public perceptions of the courts matter and in recognition of
this, considerable effort has been expended by to improve and
protect them.4
TRUST
A wide variety of constructs have been investigated within
this umbrella notion of “public perceptions of the state courts”
and include constructs like confidence, legitimacy, cynicism,
support, and so on,5 but one especially important construct is
trust. From the National Conference on Public Trust and Con-
fidence in the Justice System in 19996 to the more recent
National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice,7
trust is widely recognized as critical for positive court-com-
munity relationships. Despite the strong emphasis on the con-
struct, however, consistency in conceptualization has been elu-
sive. In fact, courts scholarship contains at least three impor-
tantly different understandings.
The first of these “versions of trust” arises primarily from
the scholarship addressing the Process Model of Legitimacy.
This model suggests that procedural concerns are especially
important for evaluations of legal authorities8 and has been
supported by an impressive body of research, especially in the
policing context.9 Trust has an important role in this literature
but, notably, its specific nature is not well-defined.10 Instead,
this “trust” is variously understood as an outcome or driver of
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procedural justice, as a subcomponent or operationalization of
legitimacy, or as an umbrella term for all perceptions of legal
authorities.11 It suffices, however, to say that this account of
trust is strongly tied to legitimacy in that both center on a per-
ception that the courts should have authority. Thus, this
account suggests that when courts behave or are expected to
behave appropriately as authorities, they will be trusted.
The second version of trust arises from political science
scholarship. Although much of this work focuses on percep-
tions of the United States Supreme Court,12 some has
addressed perceptions of the state courts specifically.13 Trust
within this literature is also somewhat inconsistently defined
but is usually associated with constructs like confidence and
support. In one of the only explicit definitions presented in
this literature, George Dougherty and colleagues argue that
trust is a fiduciary concept that concerns whether the courts
fulfill expectations.14 Thus, within this literature, trust is
strongly connected to perceptions of satisfaction with the
courts such that trust is a function of their ability to address
public expectations regarding the services they provide. 
The third version of trust in the courts comes from the
broader literature on trust more generally.15 In this work,
scholars across contexts are increasingly settling on an under-
standing of trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability to the
agency of the target of that trust.16 This account differs from
the previous two by suggesting that trust resides not in an
evaluation of the courts themselves, but is instead a psycho-
logical state or feeling within the trustor that orients them
toward acting in ways that accept their vulnerability to harm
from the direct actions of the courts.17 Thus, within this
account, trust exists when the public, recognizing this poten-
tial for harm, remains willing to work with—or at least not
against—them.
VULNERABILITY AND THE COURTS
I argue that operating from this third account has especially
strong potential to foster efforts that most successfully improve
and protect the court-community relationship, but this
requires the acceptance of two fundamental arguments: (1)
that there is potential for harm to the public in the court-com-
munity relationship and (2) that the courts are at least per-
ceived to have some level of control over this potential for
harm. 
Regarding the first argument, the most obvious potential
harms controlled by the courts are faced by defendants. For
these individuals, appearing in court necessarily opens them
up to potential harm in both outcome (e.g., an unnecessarily
harsh verdict) and process (e.g., an inability to tell their side of
the story), but other participants in court proceedings are not
immune. For example, victims risk that their attacker could go
free and witnesses risk public embarrassment in an inconsid-
erate examination. For these and other individuals, coopera-
tion with the courts requires at least a tacit acceptance of the
fact that they could experience these and other harms.
In addition to the potential for harm to participants in court
proceedings, the court-community relationship also involves
the potential for harm to the wider public. A 2009 survey by
the National Center for State Courts suggested that a little less
than half of the population has not had direct contact with the
courts.18 Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, given
their place in American life, the operation of the courts is not
inconsequential to these individuals, especially because of the
strong popular focus on them.19 Thus, one important potential
harm to this second public20 arises from violations of more
abstract notions of what the courts should be. For example,
when the courts are believed to have systemically disparate
impacts on minority communities, there is often a perceived
harm, even for individuals who are unlikely to experience
those disparate outcomes personally. The public outcry against
the abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and the backlash against the
outcome of the case against Brock Turner both serve as
poignant reminders of the fact that even though the potential
for harm to the courts’ second public may be somewhat atten-
uated as compared to those who have had direct court contact,
it is nonetheless present and influential. 
The second argument upon which this conceptualization of
trust rests regards the courts’ role in addressing the probability
and intensity of these potential harms. As noted in the defini-
tion posed above, trust is a willingness to accept vulnerability,
specifically, to the agency21 of the courts. This agency is defined
as a perceived ability to make decisions that affect the potential
harm to the trustor. Thus, even though courts are typically
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bound to specific processes or decisions (e.g., sentencing
guidelines), the considerable power differential between the
courts and the public often means that the public still per-
ceives the courts as chiefly responsible for their decisions. This
account of trust suggests that when an individual trusts the
courts, they feel that even though there is a possibility that the
courts may cause (or at least allow) some level of harm, they
are willing to take a leap of faith22 and cooperate.
IMPLICATIONS
So what does this mean for judges as they go about their daily
work of hearing cases and interacting with the public? The most
important takeaway of this argument regarding the nature of
trust lies in the proposed centrality of perceived vulnerability. As
a result, efforts to improve public perceptions that explicitly
address salient vulnerabilities should be most effective. For
judges, addressing these vulnerabilities can be as simple as
remembering that even though the courts are primarily intended
to address harm, they do create at least the potential for harm
rooted in their agentic actions. To the extent that this conceptu-
alization of trust is applicable in the state courts context, taking
the time to understand and acknowledge the potential harms
that defendants, witnesses, jurors, and victims feel as they enter
the courtroom will help build trust. Adherence to procedural
justice and working to meet expectations in these interactions
will remain relevant, but directly addressing vulnerability allows
judges to acknowledge their power differential as it matters most
to the individual and to highlight the concerns that most
saliently get in the way of a positive relationship.
Although taking time to elicit and address these perceived
vulnerabilities may be helpful in all interactions with the pub-
lic, it may well be that these discussions would be disruptive to
individual proceedings. Instead, judges may be better served by
separate engagement efforts that seek to bring representatives
into a dialogue with the court to help understand the salient
vulnerabilities that may impede a more positive relationship.
Many previous court engagement efforts have peripherally
addressed assumed vulnerabilities but most have not, as yet,
allowed these issues to take center stage: Rather than working
with communities to identify and then explicitly address the
public’s perceived vulnerabilities, most engagement efforts start
by working to determine knowledge or service gaps and work
to address them directly. Although these approaches may, in
fact, address vulnerabilities that communities feel, these prob-
lem-centered approaches may fail to allow sufficient space for
community members to highlight specific vulnerabilities as
they see them. What is needed are efforts that seek specifically
to identify the potential harms that the public is concerned
about and then work to provide the assurances necessary to
help the public see that the courts are not only aware of these
specific concerns but are worthy of being entrusted with them.
A second implication of this account of trust lies in what it
suggests about measurement. Increasingly, courts are working
to integrate monitoring and evaluation efforts that allow them
to determine efficacy, and to identify and adjust elements that
are less effective than expected. Comprehensive monitoring
and evaluation strategies often involve surveying court users or
the public generally about court processes (e.g., procedural fair-
ness), general evaluations (e.g., legitimacy and satisfaction),
and the respondents’ willingness to cooperate or actual cooper-
ation (e.g., willingness to bring current or future cases to court
for resolution). While these factors are important, the notion of
trust presented here suggests that they may neglect a critical
issue. Because trust as conceptualized here is neither an evalu-
ation of the courts nor cooperation with them, most existing
monitoring and evaluation efforts fail to account for it.23 This
may be an important oversight because evidence suggests that
trust be the intervening state that connects these evaluations to
cooperation behavior.24 This, however, should not be under-
stood to suggest that monitoring and evaluation not include
measures of evaluations or cooperation. Evaluations of the
courts should be measured, especially as performance indica-
tors. Applying this conceptualization of trust, however, sug-
gests that these perceptions will only lead to cooperation when
the individual is willing to accept their vulnerability. Similarly,
cooperation is also important to measure, but it can only be
directly addressed retroactively and in relation to specifically
identified behavior(s). Future behavior, however, by definition,
cannot be directly measured and, although it is interesting, ask-
ing people how likely they feel they would be to cooperate is not
necessarily reliable or valid. Measuring a willingness to accept
vulnerability to the agency of the courts may be closer to coop-
eration than evaluations of the courts and more applicable to a
variety of future cooperation behaviors than specific measures
of past or current cooperation. 
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